YUGOSLAVIA: IMPLICATIONS OF AN UNJUST WAR

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USAWC STRATEGY RESEARCH PROJECT

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by

Mr. Robert Saylor Department of Army Civilian

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The determination of justness in going to war with Yugoslavia is a critical strategic issue for military leaders. United States (U.S.) policy has steadily increased its resort to military intervention, first on humanitarian grounds in the case of Yugoslavia and most recently in Iraq. In both cases it can be argued that the U.S. violated internationally accepted laws of sovereignty. This Strategic Research Project (SRP) examines the justness of the war with Yugoslavia and discusses implications of that intervention. Its analysis challenges government positions, arguing that the position statements are focused more on public relations efforts than on reality. It argues that distortions and omissions in reporting on the war in Yugoslavia and Kosovo have contributed to current misconceptions. It concludes with the need for accurately informing the U.S. public, a need for truthful government, and a conscientious military to restore the nation's greatness and its global stature.

YUGOSLAVIA: IMPLICATIONS OF AN UNJUST WAR

Few men are willing to brave the disapproval of their fellows, the censure of their colleagues, the wrath of their society. Moral courage is a rarer commodity than bravery in battle or great intelligence. Yet it is the one essential, vital quality for those who seek to change the world which yields most painfully to change.¹

— Robert F. Kennedy 1966

The U.S war with Yugoslavia² began when the U.S. took sides in the Yugoslavia Civil War and It continues today with the recognition of Kosovo. The ethics of the war with Yugoslavia raises a critical strategic issue. The military members bear the physical and psychological brunt of such operations, popular support is necessary for expenditure of blood and treasure, and justness is paramount in a republic's most serious action – the decision to wage war. At West Point, Noam Chomsky³ recently informed his audience of cadets of the United Nations (UN) position that there is no new right to protect or intervene and that U.S. military actions that are not sanctioned by the UN Charter destroy the foundations of world order.⁴ In the current political climate, some Americans question the justness of our war in Iraq and wonder if the decision to invade was an isolated error or part of an emerging pattern. Revisiting the justness of the war with Yugoslavia reveals an emerging U.S. doctrine of intervention, along with evidence of media manipulation. This paper examines the justness of the humanitarian intervention doctrine as it was applied in the war with Yugoslavia and argues that the doctrine has in effect changed international law to recognize a super-sovereign prerogative.5

America's claims of just recourse to war will be examined within the context of international law, truthfulness, and accuracy. The battles in Krajina, Sarajevo, and

Kosovo will be examined as specific examples of the unjustness of U.S. action. Finally, this analysis will discuss media manipulation by a US public relations firm hired by Croatian, Bosnian, and Kosovo separatists and the implications of such manipulation. This paper thus argues that the war with Yugoslavia was unjust within the confines of generally accepted interpretations of international law.



Yugoslavia, 1990-20026

Background - Understanding the Conflict

The world watched the agony of Yugoslavia's civil war unfold for almost four years.

There were extensive debates and hand wringing as to what to do. The U.S.

administration supported UN operations for three years but finally yielded to the advocates of intervention. In retrospect, some relevant factors were not often

addressed in mainstream media,⁷ but should be considered in a thorough and objective analysis of the conflict.

There is a common understanding of the history of the war with Yugoslavia that basically vilifies the Serbs. Media critic Philip Hammond observed that within 24 hours of the start of NATO bombing, Slobodan Milosevic was described as a warlord, Serb butcher, butcher of Belgrade, butcher of Balkans, the most evil dictator to emerge in Europe since Adolf Hitler, a psychopath, and Serb tyrant. The standardized vilification of Serbs have become part of history: Croatia, Bosnia, and Kosovo were saved from total destruction by the U.S. who rescued it from Slobodan Milosevic's depredations.

Unmentioned in most accounts of the war is the fact that as early as 1984, despite Yugoslavia's status as a sovereign nation and charter membership in the UN, major forces were aligning to dissolve it. The absolute post-WWII consensus that borders are sacrosanct was quietly dissolved. According to Michael Parenti, the Reagan administration issued US National Security Decision Directive 133, "United States Policy toward Yugoslavia" which was updated to advocate a "quiet revolution" in Yugoslavia. In the early 1990s Germany, Hungary, Italy and the Vatican openly encouraged the breakup of Yugoslavia. Their rationale was based on the historical ties of religion, ideology, and WWII. These interests certainly coincided with some economic interests and the agendas of the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID), World Trade Organization, and World Bank. The notion of powerful forces undermining the sovereignty of a country through the influence of world economic organizations is carefully examined in John Perkins' The Confessions of an Economic Hit Man. His experiences and revelations cast light on the possible contributions of U.S.

corporations, the World Bank, and United States Agency for International Development (USAID) on Yugoslavia's economic plight and ultimate dissolution.

In November 1990, the first Bush Administration and Congress passed the 1991 Foreign Operations Appropriations Law 101-513, which cut off funding for Yugoslavia and authorized new appropriations only to each of its six separate republics. ¹⁵ The U.S. had supported Yugoslavia for five decades, and then launched a program that caused economic disarray and precipitated communal violence in the country. ¹⁶ According to a 28 Nov 1990 The New York Times article, the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) predicted that this new law would lead to a bloody civil war. ¹⁷ The article also stated that the Yugoslav experiment had failed and that the country would break up, probably triggering ethnic violence and unrest. ¹⁸ These prophetic statements will be examined later through discussion of the CIAs efforts to facilitate this end-state.

In 1991 a European conference favored the dissolution of Yugoslavia into sovereign and independent republics. ¹⁹ Later, oil and drug interests supported dissolving and advocating Muslim independence in both Bosnia and Kosovo. There is strong evidence to support this advocacy in <u>Jane's Intelligence Review</u>, which warns of Muslim narco-terrorism related to Kosovo. ²⁰ Clearly, prior to the onset of hostilities, various groups had aligned to undermine Yugoslavia's sovereignty.

In 1991, these external influences fueled separatist tendencies and led to the eventual declarations of independence by Slovenia, Croatia, and Macedonia. The central government in Belgrade quickly arrived at agreements between Slovenia and Macedonia; meanwhile Croatia and Bosnia clashed over their borders. When civil war erupted, the primary issue was not necessarily the right to secede but the designation of

the boundaries. While the stated U.S. policy was to support a peaceful resolution, the actual U.S. policy did not. An example of questionable U.S. policy was its decision to deem the state borders as inviolate, but not the federal borders. This only confounded international law: When can a people claim the right of self-determination?

International Law

Was the war with Yugoslavia just? The International Law of War prohibits any action or intervention into a sovereign nation unless it has been attacked or in situations of dire emergency, and then only with UN approval. Classic just war doctrine is contained in the works of St. Thomas Aquinas and Hugo Grotius as well as the Geneva Convention, customary laws, legal writings and conventions, and treaties. ²¹ The Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties specifically addresses the principles of international law embodied UN charter. Specifically, it address the sovereign equality and independence of all States and non-interference in others domestic affairs. ²²

Further, the UN Charter's Articles 2.1 and 2.7 declare that there is equality among sovereign member states; they enjoin members in a pledge not to "interfere" in the domestic affairs of others. ²³ The UN then updated the concept of non-interference to allow peacekeeping. ²⁴ The UN provides the international litmus test for legitimacy of interventions, and US Security Council approval is necessary for international legitimacy. Arguably, international law was violated by the U.S.-led NATO intervention since the Security Council made no declaration, Serbia did not commit an act of aggression, and their actions posed no threat to U.S. or NATO security.

This U.S.-led NATO intervention signaled the emergence of the U.S. preventive war doctrine. With the war with Yugoslavia, the U.S. has tacitly exercised the rights of a

super-sovereign and fundamentally changed the Westphalian concept of equality among sovereign states. Edwina Campbell suggests in Strategic Studies Quarterly that many Europeans feel that they now understand the implications of the war with Yugoslavia. They have learned from this war the lessons of globalism and its associated ethical flaws. Yet Americans generally view the war with Yugoslavia as a NATO operation, conducted with the full support of the NATO countries.²⁵

In a 2001 <u>Parameters</u> article, Brigadier General Ronald Scott Mangum concluded that NATO's attack on Serbia was either an anomaly or evidence of emerging doctrine. Mangum considered the Kosovo war in the context of Tony Blair's doctrine for asserting the international community's right to intervene to protect human rights. He concluded that if this is a new doctrine of international law, there are serious doubts that these criteria were met in Kosovo.²⁶

However, an integral part of international law grants the right of individual nations to interpret the law in their own way. ²⁷ So the foregoing references to international law cannot be used to prove injustice. Domestically, in the final analysis, people of a nation are the final arbiters of just causes of war. Their judgments are enacted through their perceptions and votes. The following analysis revisits specific examples of the war and offers an alternate perspective. The following discussions analyze the situations surrounding the U.S. military support for Croatia in the Krajina and for the Muslims in Sarajevo and Kosovo. This analysis reveals that media manipulation fueled public outcry for U.S. intervention. The expansion of U.S. power under these circumstances is discomfiting. The U.S. should conform to international standards, participate in the creation of a vision of new internationally accepted intervention doctrine to alleviate

growing fears throughout the international community of reckless intervention, or simply act more altruistically and less militarily.

Krajina and Croatia: A Territorial Dispute

Understanding Krajina is critical to understanding the war because many subsequent problems emanated from this situation. When Croatia began to move toward independence, the movement was accompanied by a resurgence of Nazi-era rhetoric. The Serbs feared this resurgence because Croatians had massacred over 500,000 Serbs in WWII. 28 Unfortunately, the official Croatian administration actions. supported by the U.S. highlighted these fears: They issued Nazi-era currency; they promulgated revisionist history and then proposed and eventually finalized a Croatian constitution that was blatantly discriminatory.²⁹ Also, the Croatians exalted the WWII criminal Ante Pavelic, otherwise known as the "Butcher of the Balkans," who had escaped prosecution dressed as a priest and transported by the Vatican to Spain.³⁰ All of this antagonistic activity should have offended American sensibilities and so should the Croatian destruction of Jasenovac, ³¹ the memorial to the victims of WWII. But the U.S. and the interested Europeans ignored all this as well as the fact that the beginning of the ethnic-cleansing can be traced to Gospic, an Ustashe stronghold. In September 1991, it was there that the Croatians first expulsed the Serbs and massacred those that came back or remained.³² Confessions of Miro Bajramovic describe the torture and killing of Serbs. His testimony also implicates Senior Croatian leaders in part of an orchestrated plan.³³ This atrocity was reminiscent of the Serbian memories of the WWII Croatian war criminal Andrija Artukovitc.³⁴ This is especially relevant as it was in 1986³⁵ that he was finally extradited from his home in California.

The Krajina was part of Serbia regardless of the Croatian state boundary, ³⁶ a right which Croatia disputes. After years of an arms buildup and training, the Croatian militarily supported by the U.S. launched an offensive to retake the Krajina.

The Serbs sought independence and wanted a popular referendum to recognize the right of self-determination for their land. They had their own "national guard" and could defend themselves. The Serbs initiated protective measures from Croatian nationalism, but the Croatians argued for an indivisible national border. General (Ret.) Charles G. Boyd, Deputy Commander, USEUCOM, Nov 1992-July 1995, in a rare break with the military tradition of silence observed "Much of what Zagreb calls the occupied territories is in fact land held by Serbs for more than three centuries."³⁷ In the ensuing battles, both sides practiced ethnic cleansing. ³⁸ In 1991 the Serbians proclaimed the autonomous Republic of Krajina. The U.N. sent in peacekeepers to maintain the fragile peace and instituted an arms and training embargo on the warring parties.³⁹

However, as early as 1992, the UN peace efforts were destabilized by massive Croatian imports of arms. ⁴⁰ In 1993 the U.N. warned the West that air strikes against the Serbs or re-arming the Muslims would imperil the peace process. ⁴¹ Despite this, in 1993 the United States was aiding the Croatian military, while the U.S.Military Professional Resources Incorporated delivered tactical training to the Croatian military and shared intelligence information. ⁴² In 1994 U.S. Secretary of Defense William Perry signed an agreement with the Croatian military. ⁴³ Anthony Lake's testimony in 1997 to the Senate acknowledged the administration's tacit approval of Iranian arms shipments to Bosnia via Croatia. ⁴⁴ Croatia then retained up to half of the weapons destined for Bosnian Muslims. ⁴⁵ In the foreign press, the U.S. Ambassador to Croatia Peter Galbraith

confirmed that President Clinton, without Congressional approval, allowed Croatia to violate the UN arms embargo without penalty.⁴⁶ Further, <u>The New York Times</u> article detailed the friction between the CIA and Ambassador Galbraith regarding legitimacy of the secret policy of ignoring the embargo and the public policy of upholding it.⁴⁷

On 4 August 1995, in response to UN Peacekeepers being shelled with artillery, four U.S. Navy Jets flew against the Serbs, 48 despite the fact that the UN Peacekeepers were actually being shelled by the Croatians. 49 On 5 August 1995 The London Times reported a massive Croatian offensive against the Serbs in the Krajina.⁵⁰ NATO jets destroyed a Krajina Serb radar installation and neutralized Serb missile sites which could strike Zagreb⁵¹ as well as those in close proximity to the Croatian attack.⁵² The U.S. had not only bypassed the UN arms embargo for the Croatians by providing them with contractors and armaments but had also directly participated in the attack.⁵³ U.S.-launched unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAV's) in Croatia were used to "monitor radio communications, and spot the radar-tracking systems used by ground troops to direct the fire of anti-aircraft guns and missiles."54 With U.S. support, the Croatian military drove Serbs from their homes in Krajina. This massive ethnic cleansing dwarfed any atrocities the Serbs were alleged to have committed, including those in Srebrenica and Sarajevo. "Operation Storm," by conservative estimates, resulted in ethnic cleansing of nearly 200,000 Serbs. It was "the worst single incident of ethnic cleansing in the entire sequence of the Yugoslav wars."55 The fact that the UN was being shelled by the Croatians and the U.S. jets attacked the Serbs was not considered by the military.

Croatian General Ante Gotovina was convicted of crimes against humanity and war crimes committed in Operation Storm. A 2001 Newsweek article reported that the

Croatian people support General Gotovina and the Croatian government. The article implicates the CIA and the Pentagon, claiming that U.S. officials observed and approved of the Croatian military's actions. ⁵⁶ American officials acknowledged that UAVs were launched from a U.S. base in Croatia and that the U.S. had a "liaison relationship with Croatia." ⁵⁷ In fact, the advantage created by this U.S. favoritism was immeasurable, probably decisive.

Referring to the Krajina and "Operation Storm" General (Ret.) Boyd Deputy

Commander of USEUCOM during the critical period Nov 1992-July 1995, reported:

Recently more than 90 percent of the Serbs in western Slavonia were ethnically cleansed ...Ethnic cleansing evokes condemnation only when it is committed by Serbs, not against them. We must see things in the Balkans as they are, not as we wish them to be. We must separate reality from image ⁵⁸

The UN advocates peaceful intervention only when there are "violations of human rights that offend every precept of our common humanity." The U.S. far exceeded this UN doctrine by taking sides in what was a civil war, by violating UN-mandated arms embargos, and by providing intelligence to the Croatians. The U.S. support to Croatia with weapons, ammunition, training, and air support simply violates basic concepts of legitimacy. In rendering Croatia such assistance, the U.S. violated U.N. concepts of international justness and exhibited super-sovereign behavior. These actions are unjust.

Sarajevo

Sarajevo gained notoriety as the primary U.S. justification to intervene militarily in Bosnia. Based on the Serbian shelling of the Sarajevo "safe area," the U.S. led a retaliatory NATO⁶⁰ bombing campaign, "Operation Deliberate Force," which starting on 31 August 1995 bombed the Serbs for two weeks. There were 750 NATO attacks of 56

Serbian target complexes. Assisted by this US-led NATO operation, Muslim and Croat ground forces maneuvered tactically. ⁶¹ The NATO attack responded to three major explosions in Sarajevo that were attributed to the Serbs and claimed the lives of dozens. The media had reported a succession of such attacks: (1) the 27 May 1992 "breadline massacre" (2) the 5 February 1994 "market massacre," and (3) the 28 August 1995 "second market massacre." Consider now each retaliation in context – and from the media's reportage.

An alternate perspective is provided in <u>The Independent</u>, a London article written on 22 August 1992 regarding the first attack, reports that Muslims slaughtered their own people and the Bosnian Bread queue massacre was a propaganda ploy. ⁶² The "world's press concluded that the atrocity was caused by mortar bombs fired from a Serbian held position and the attack was widely interpreted as a cynical display of defiance by the Serbs." ⁶³ The televised scenes showed dead bodies and terrified, crying people with severed limbs...in pools of blood. ⁶⁴ Horrified international public opinion then coalesced to support military intervention. ⁶⁵ However, in reports to the UN force commander, General Staish Nambiar concluded that "Bosnian forces loyal to President Alija Izetbegovic may have detonated a bomb." ⁶⁶ U.S. military columnist David Hackworth confirmed this as well. ⁶⁷ Further, French Major General Philippe Morillon also discussed the Muslims' proclivity for bombing, then blaming the Serbs. ⁶⁸

The second attack on 5 February 1994, George Coply, editor of <u>Defense and Foreign Affairs Strategic Policy</u>, offered an alternate perspective. In "Image Manipulation Prolongs War," he claimed that it seems certain that the explosive was a

locally placed charge. "Alija Izetbegovic immediately blamed the Bosnian Serbs for the attack who immediately denied responsibility." Significantly, Israeli newspaper Davar recounted the events, 10 claiming that the UN has confirmed that Muslims on several occasions have set off explosives in the proximity of their own people and had snipers fire into crowds of their own citizens in Sarajevo at times when they needed to arouse Western sympathy. 11

Despite the fact that U N personnel reported that they were unable to determine where the shell had come from and who fired it, the Serbs were blamed. Mainstream media images again shocked the world. Images of the city's battled and besieged suffering served as valuable tools for the Bosnian government. NATO officially presented the Bosnian Serbs with an ultimatum to either remove their heavy equipment from the hills overlooking Sarajevo or be subjected to air strikes. The Bosnian Serb President Karadzic demanded an inquiry, and a five-member U.N. Committee confirmed that they were unable to determine unequivocally the cause and origin of the explosion. But mainstream media offered no retractions, and the incident is still used to justify the U.S.-led NATO bombing.

General (Ret.) Charles G. Boyd noted that some of the suffering was imposed by the criminal elements within the militia and by Sarajevo's government policy itself.

Muslim forces would shell the airport knowing the press and US would blame it on the Serbs. The situation was exacerbated by self-imposed water shortages and the associated images created for CNN.⁷³

Then came the third attack on the 28 August 1995, labeled the "second market massacre." Strangely, while analysis of the other bombings extended over weeks, CNN

reported within 24 hours that UNPROFOR Lt. Gen Rupert Smith concluded beyond any reasonable doubt that the attack came from the Serbs. In The Nation (2 Oct 1995)

David Binder cites raised concerns by four specialists – a Russian, a Canadian and two Americans – suggesting instead that the mortar was fired not by the Serbs, but by Bosnian Government forces. Further, in London's Defense and Foreign Affairs

Strategic Policy Journal:

US Congressional officials and intelligence officials in the UK are also aware that there was strong collusion between US officials and Bosnian Izetbegovic people on planting the *casus belli* for the latest bombing....There was also no collateral damage consistent with an incoming round and just as was proven and stated by UN observers after the previous "marketplace mortar attack", it was clear that this was also a pre-placed charge...just before important peace talks were to begin.⁷⁶

Thus it is reasonable to speculate that the US-led NATO air strikes were not just retaliations for the three civilian "massacres" mentioned above, but for the thousands of shells lobbed into Sarajevo and other parts of Bosnia by the Serbs. In <u>Foreign Affairs</u> (December 1995), General (Ret.) Charles G. Boyd observed that:

The claim that ethnic cleansing, rape, and murder were part of a Belgradeplanned policy and therefore different from the similar, decentralized behavior of the Muslim and Croat forces is more evident to distant academics than to first-hand observers...when you read all-source intelligence reports...all have committed unspeakable atrocities against each other.⁷⁷

General Boyd offers further insights into the national interests: "The U.S. says that its objective is to end the war through a negotiated settlement, but in reality what it wants is to influence the outcome in favor of the Muslims." These actions, obvious to Europeans, have weakened America's authority to provide effective diplomatic leadership and calls into question the justness of the U.S. interventions in the region.

Kosovo

Kosovo is a critical and extremely relevant foreign policy issue. Its current declaration of independence should be viewed from the perspective of the 1999 U.S. led attack on Serbia in its defense. Justification for this mission came with the April 1999 State Department's alarming claim that up to 500,000 Kosovar Albanians were missing and feared dead. 80 President Bill Clinton called this a "human catastrophe." Then U.S. Defense Secretary William Cohen reduced the count to 100,000. Then came reports that Albanian bodies were being disposed of in the hydrochloric acid of the Trepca mine.81 Operation Allied Force, conducted for 78 days between 24 March and 10 June 1999, carried out 14,000 bombing missions on behalf of the Kosovo-Albanians.82 The Serbian military, infrastructure, and population were targeted. With this ability for a U.S. president to act with such alacrity comes the responsibility to do so in a just manner. However, upon examination, the details and accuracy of our leaders' justifications during this humanitarian crisis reveal that perhaps only 2,000 on all sides died in the conflict. As a result of the U.S. attack, about 500 Serbian non-combatants died.83 Further, claims of disposal of victims in the Trepica Mine were false.⁸⁴ Again, the U.S. seems to have had a weak case for intervening on behalf of Kosovo's Albanians, which supports the judgment that the war was unjust.

Of the State Departments reported 500,000 dead, very few bodies have been produced. The more accurate number, according to Major General MacKenzie is about 2,000 of all ethnic origins. Did atrocities occur? Yes, by all sides during a violent insurrection. Was the central government blameworthy? Absolutely, Milosevic's forces carried out mass expulsions of people, destroying their homes and property. These acts are inexcusable and they often occur in insurrections. But there is an enormous

difference between 2,000 killed on both sides and 500,000 killed on one side: The former does not necessarily warrant intervention during which collateral deaths (five hundred non-combatants died in the NATO attack) are not proportional to those saved.

When US forces captured the Trepica mining operation — the site where hundreds of thousands of bodies were allegedly disposed of — they found no bodies and no evidence that vats had been used for body disposal. However, the Serbs still lost the mine, which was given to the Muslims. ⁸⁹ In 2007 the mine was estimated to be worth \$10 billion. ⁹⁰ When evidence of mass burials was not found, the rationale for war shifted to the plight of the mass refuges. But according to Congressman and presidential candidate Ron Paul (R-Tex) the American public was not informed that that the vast majority of the refugee problem was caused by the US bombing. ⁹¹

During questioning about the Operation, the US Senate Republican Policy Committee on 31 March 1999 found out that Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA) was financing arms purchases via the heroin trade. ⁹² Europol was uncovering growing evidence that drug money funded the KLA and facilitated the purchase of grenade launchers, anti-tank weapons, and AK-47s. ⁹³ Further, the KLA was known to be receiving support from Osama bin laden's al-Qaeda organization. ⁹⁴ Kosovo was an ideal transit point for drugs, slaves and weapons between the Islamic countries and Europe. ⁹⁵

Recently deceased Colonel David Hackworth, USA, one of the nation's most highly decorated soldiers, reported in 2001 that the CIA had been training, funding, and supplying the KLA in order to conduct a guerrilla campaign to undermine Yugoslavia. He quoted a European Commander in Britain's *Observer* newspaper who claimed that

the CIA had a private army in Kosovo, and that the U.S. State Department was "incapable of reining in the bastard army." A related London Times article claimed Europeans felt betrayed by the CIA relationship with the KLA, going back to 1998 and that the CIA was involved in the countdown to the air strikes.

In 2004, retired Canadian Major General Lewis MacKenzie, who commanded UN troops during the Bosnian civil war in 1992, claimed that Kosovo has become the crime capital of Europe, receiving drugs from Afghanistan and hosting a flourishing slave trade. ⁹⁹ His claim is consistent with Stacy Sullivan's <u>Be Not Afraid, For You Have Sons in America</u>: How a Brooklyn Roofer Helped Lure the US into the Kosovo War, which describes a remarkable story of gunrunning, manipulation of mass media, and political intrigue. It offers a disturbing glimpse into what the war was about. Dana Priest's <u>The Mission</u> describes the feelings of the U.S. soldiers on the ground in Kosovo, who saw the Serbian "enemies" become victims right before their very eyes. ¹⁰⁰ For the soldiers, the Serbs became the good guys and the Albanians, the bad guys. ¹⁰¹

Kosovo is the sixth–century birthplace of Serbian religion and culture. The southwestern half of Kosovo is called Metohija or "Church land." Many of these churches have been designated as UNESCO cultural heritage sites. The U.S. recognition of Albanian Kosovo is akin to legitimizing stealing and is unjust. Similar to Osama bin Laden's destruction of 2,000-year-old Buddhist monuments in Afghanistan, the KLA continues to destroy Kosovo's churches and monasteries. In 2004 thirty Serbian Orthodox churches and monasteries were destroyed, and more than three hundred homes and six Serbian villages were burnt to the ground. Thirty Serbs were

killed, six hundred were wounded. One-hundred and fifty international peacekeepers were themselves injured.

The U.S. has recognized Kosovo's independence despite on-going threats to the Serb minority¹⁰³ and the Albanians inability to effectively govern themselves or control criminal activities. So the prerequisites for statehood are nonexistent.¹⁰⁴ This U.S. policy undermines the UN, ignores the sanctity of international law, and contributes to the global image of a U.S. exercising a policy of force, with no regard for justice.

In January 2008, Serbia complained that an EU mission to transition Kosovo to independence was illegal; if implemented, it would annul the proposed Stabilization and Association Agreement. ¹⁰⁵ The Serbian position has not changed even with the election of the pro-West Boris Tadic. The new Serbian President would never abandon Kosovo as part of Serbia. ¹⁰⁶ While the US currently recognizes Albanian Kosovo's independence, this SRP argues that it is critical that this policy be reexamined and changed. According to Chris Abbot of the Oxford Research Group, "many commentators have since argued that genocide was not in fact occurring in Kosovo." ¹⁰⁷ Further, he describes the problem of establishment of this new doctrine as international law: Since it cannot be codified by a larger body of international law because it represent only the interests, rights, values, customs and mores or the U.S. and its friends and not the original concepts of world order envisioned by the UN. Under these circumstances the war with Yugoslavia can be seen as unjust.

Public Relations

Dr. Craig Nation of the Army War College has noted that "Sorting out fact from fiction in the volatile circumstances of armed conflict is never easy. In the Yugoslav

case, where efforts to demonize the enemy became a strategy of war pursued by professional public relations firms such as Ruder Finn Global Affairs, the challenge was particularly severe."108 Many sources agree that this public relations firm is the center of the controversy concerning manipulation of U.S. public opinion to perceive only one side of a very complex issue. 109 Indeed David Owen in Balkan Odyssey describes an "explosive encounter" with the editors of the New York Times when he tried to present some of his views on Bosnia. 110 Peter Brock's Media Cleansing: Dirty Reporting Journalism and Tragedy in Yugoslavia, makes a strong argument for the media's manipulation of the American people. Gregory Copley, President of the International Strategic Studies Association and Editor of <u>Defense and Foreign Affairs</u> declares: "His [Brock's] indictment of the media for its biased contribution to the start and ongoing conduct of the war is valid...the Balkan wars showed that, unchecked, the media could, without accountability, bring about the downfall of nations...Peter Brock's book should be the basis for both Congressional and independent media inquiries."111 Indeed, government involvement in the manipulation of U.S. perceptions is not new. In 1997 the GAO found that the State Department engaged in prohibited, covert propaganda activities designed to influence the media and public to support the administration's Latin American policies. 112

Interestingly, in March 2005 the UN was reviewing its use of "pro bono" services of David Finn, chairman of the public relations company mentioned above, to Secretary-General Annan. The relationship of Secretary Annan with Finn (of Ruder-Finn) is particularly suspect since it evolved during the Kosovo war.¹¹³ Indeed, Lord Owen, the former EU mediator, stated that the Bosnian government, backed by public relations

techniques honed in the United States, manipulated the international press.¹¹⁴ Further, Martin Bell, a BBC journalist, complained that the Bosnian war left him with the conviction that foreign policy is based on national interest, not principle.¹¹⁵ The Bosnian government was basing its decisions on hopes generated by imagistic manipulations and psychological operations. Thus, the Bosnian President kept refusing to accept peace, waiting instead for the West, particularly the US, to force the situation to its advantage.

The Serbian argument against independence for Kosovo is irrefutable; it is based on fundamental legalities of international order. As the Serbian prime minister stated last year, "In its struggle for Kosovo, Serbia is also struggling for fundamental principles of international justice and order. And, by defending an inalienable part of its territory, Serbia may even be defending the future of democracy as a way of life and a view of the world.¹¹⁶"

A Wilson Center¹¹⁷ article titled "Media Coverage: Help or Hindrance in Conflict Prevention" claimed that reporters distorted the news, did not include qualifying information, and misrepresented the overall situation during the disintegration of Yugoslavia. There is indeed evidence of corporate policies to entice news organizations to take sides under a veil of objectivity. ¹¹⁸

The U.S. policy with regard to recognition of Kosovo is both misleading and dangerous. Although Kosovo was designated part of Serbia under UN Resolution 1244,¹¹⁹ U.S. recognition of Kosovo's independence portends the continuation of conflict, not the peaceful international order envisioned through compliance with the UN Charter. Ethically, historically and physically, Kosovo is part of Serbia; to recognize

Kosovo's independence is to authorize narco-terrorism and legitimize a country founded on criminal activities. Most critically, it sets an international precedent for separatist movements and erodes the rule of law.

Implications of an Unjust War

This analysis has validated the consequences of media manipulation, and described the new U.S. role of the super-sovereign, and has noted a growing global awareness of an unjust and untruthful U.S. At issue is the identity of the U.S. as a nation. If the U.S. is the sole superpower, it should create an altruistic vision and abide, to the best of its ability, by that vision. The U.S. war with Yugoslavia may have signaled the beginning of a more widespread phenomenon of political disintegration inseparable from international change and interdependence.¹²⁰

But while the press may be free, the U.S. public is not well informed. So instead of intelligent debate there is orchestrated opinion. As this SRP reveals, unknown influences on U.S. politics, supported by manipulative media, affect the perceptions of the general population and the actions of the U.S.

The U.S. government, despite information readily available to the contrary, supports the media's manipulation. Presidential candidate and Congressman Ron Paul (R-Texas) has stated that the U.S. involvement in the Former Yugoslavia was an attack on a sovereign state: "The result of the illegal and immoral NATO intervention in the Balkans speaks for itself: NATO troops will occupy the Balkans for the foreseeable future. No peace has been attained, merely the cessation of hostilities." Naom Chomsky offers insight into this issue through reference to Woodrow Wilson's admonitions: "The masters of the government of the United States are the combined

capitalists and manufacturers of the United States." Further, he quotes John Dewey, "Politics is the shadow cast on society by big business" and will remain so as long as power resides in "business for private profit through private control of banking, land, industry, reinforced by command of the press, press agents and other means of publicity and propaganda." This profit motive is not always in the best interest of the U.S. or the international community.

While business is the life-blood of the U.S. and business interests are critical in our foreign relations, U.S. actions in the war with Yugoslavia reveal a possible rationale to go to war for business reasons and a purposeful manipulation of public perception to gain support for these wars. Business is important; but it is equally important that U.S. citizens are informed with basic truths in order to make well-founded decisions regarding the expenditure of funds for unnecessary wars or for domestic infrastructure, health care, education, and social security. This complex association of domestic, business and international factors is difficult to understand. Homer Lea¹²⁴ described the situation exceptionally well: "Only when arbitration is able to unravel the tangled skein of crime and hypocrisy among individuals can it be extended to communities and nations, as nations are only man in the aggregate, they are the aggregate of his crimes and deception and depravity, and so long as these constitute the basis of individual impulse, so long will they control the acts of nations." ¹²⁵

In the final analysis, the implications of this unjust war opened Pandora's Box.

Already Abkhazia, 126 south Nepal, 127 and the Armenians of Azerbaijan 128 have appealed to the world community for independence, citing Kosovo as a precedent. In the meantime Cypriots wait in fear that Turkish side will claim independence on the

island.¹²⁹ These movements, in combination with existing separatist movements in the U.S. states of Hawaii¹³⁰ and southern California,¹³¹ portend years of conflict, now closer to home.

Conclusion

The implications of an unjust war are magnified by the unwillingness of the US to comply with or attempt to amend the international rules governing warfare.

Unsanctioned U.S. aggression is weakening American legitimacy and jeopardizing U.S. identity as a world leader. "Many foreigners, including close allies, have concluded that the world's superpower now operates outside the law." This negative perception is culminating with the U.S. recognition of Albanian Kosovo.

U.S. actions against Yugoslavia and in recognizing Kosovo have redefined international law and created great concern about the ethics of our government and our ability to effectively utilize the policies of preemptive or preventative military action or the value of U.S. recognition of a country. Our national values and our role as a global leader are challenged by our engagement in what many perceive as unnecessary, unjust, and illegal wars.

When the influence of mass media manipulates public opinion to support an unjust war, something is dangerously wrong. Truth in government is essential and should be guaranteed. U.S. citizens are obliged to judge their government critically and thoughtfully to ensure truthfulness and to maintain their freedom from an oppressive regime. Frederick Douglass declared: "If there is no struggle, there is no progress. Those who profess to favor freedom and renounce controversy are people who want crops without plowing the ground" Critical analysis and free thought foster a moral

culture that guarantees and protects the civil liberties of all the citizens. Further, we must repudiate all forms of coercion and seek independent thought and opinion. As President Eisenhower stated, "Only alert and responsible citizenry can prevent misplaced power."

Indeed, since the Civil War the U.S. has tried to develop rules of proper conduct ¹³⁶ in going to war and in waging war, but now appears to be diverging from this tradition. The U.S. should return to its overarching compliance with rules. The perception that the mainstream media has failed to accurately report critical events should be disturbing; this disturbing prospect raises serious questions regarding truth in television news, business influence, and the election process. Truth in government is a right under the U.S. Constitution and should be demanded.

Adherence to international rules of law and order are especially imperative regarding our decision to recognize Kosovo. This SRP argues that the U.S. should change its policy. Only the values accorded to people under the large body of international human rights law can be legitimately supported.

Ultimately, individual U.S. citizens arbitrate justness with their vote and their insistence on the truth. This analysis is offered to enlighten fellow Americans. The evidence in this analysis should cause us to question the wisdom of the continued exercise of super-sovereign power and disregard of international law.

This paper has argued, as Noam Chomsky and many others have, that "the gap between professional ideals of just war and actual practice is much too large to be tolerated." As the identity of the nation and its military have been transformed through the process of recent wars, this SRP was written with hope that this analysis will direct

interest on historical decisions and the most current and relevant issue — Kosovo's independence. Homer Lea said it best: "To free a nation from error is to enlighten the individual, and only to the degree that the individual will be receptive to the truth can a nation be free from the vanity which ends with national ruin." ¹³⁸

Endnotes

- ¹ Robert F. Kennedy, available from http://www.quotationspage.com/quote/27527.html; Internet; accessed 28 January 2008
- ² While US actions did not involve an actual declaration of war and could be described as an action or attack, this paper considers the actions war and designates the entire event the "war with Yugoslavia." The phrase is used to collectively describe all actions committed by the U.S. targeted at the demise of Yugoslavia or the territorial area of the country formerly known as Yugoslavia. Although NATO was involved, it is the position of this paper that each nation is responsible for its own actions.
- ³ Noam Chomsky is an American linguist, philosopher, political activist, author and lecturer. He is a professor emeritus of linguistics and political science at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology. Credited with the theory of generative grammar, he made a significant contribution to linguistics.
- ⁴ Noam Chomsky, Lecture on Just War Theory given at the U.S. Military Academy at West Point, 20 April 2006, available from http://www.chomsky.info; Internet; accessed 19 February 2008. A UN high level panel on Article 51 led to the conclusion that to change the UN direction regarding Just War would destroy world order. An elementary international principle declares that to allow one to act, allows all to act.
- ⁵ Super-sovereign is used to describe the actions of a sole superpower. In this paper the term is used to describe the position of the U.S. Combined with a strong sense of exceptionalism and manifest destiny, the U.S. now seems willing to, in its own interests, go beyond the limits of generally accepted international norms. However, actions outside of a code are not in accordance with the international principles of justice, faith and honor. More information on this concept can be found at http://jurist.law.pitt.edu/forum/forumnew104.php.
- ⁶ Andras Bereznay, available from http://www.historyonmaps.com/BWSamples/ExYugoslavia; accessed March 24 2008.
- ⁷ The term mainstream media is used to differentiate a segment of what is known collectively as a free and open press. TV's ability to manipulate the general public's opinion is not to infer that the U.S. does not have a free and open press, only that TV news is more entertainment than information. Its tremendous sway on public opinion should be minimized by a responsible government that has access to broader perspectives.
- ⁸ Roy Gutman, *How We Missed the Story: Osama Bin Laden, the Taliban, and the Hijacking of Afghanistan* (Washington, D.C.: United States Institute of Peace, 2008), 5, 81.

This book offers an example of the standardized vilification of Serbs that have become part of history: Croatia, Bosnia, and Kosovo were saved from total destruction, rescuing it from Slobodan Milosevic's depredations.

- ⁹ Diana Johnstone, *Fools' Crusade: Yugoslavia, NATO and Western Delusions* (New York:Pluto Press, 2002), p.17
- ¹⁰ James Lyons, "Kosovo Train-Wreck Warnings," *The Washington Times*, 2 January 2008, p. A10.
- ¹¹ Michael Parenti, *To Kill a Nation: The Attack on Yugoslavia* (New York: Verso, 2000), 25-26.
- ¹² R. Craig Nation, *War in the Balkans 1991-2002* (Carlisle, PA.: U.S. Army War College, Strategic Studies Institute, 2003), 103.
 - ¹³ Parenti, 21.
- ¹⁴John Perkins, *The Confessions of an Economic Hit Man* (San Francisco: BK Publishers, 2004).

Tells the story of his career with consulting firm Chas. T. Main and association with the National Security Agency. Perkins describes his role as follows: Economic Hit Men are highly paid professionals who funnel money from the World Bank, the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID), and other foreign, "aid" organizations into the coffers of huge corporations and the pockets of a few wealthy families who control the planet's natural resources. Their tools include fraudulent financial reports, rigged elections, payoffs, extortion, sex, and murder. They play a game of empires with a new and terrifying dimensions of globalization. Many critics that dismiss his findings and identify him as a conspiracy theorist. However, Perkins boss at Chas T. Main, Einar Greve, was stated as saying in the Tucson Citizen that basically the story is true. This was later recanted. Available from https://www.tucsoncitizen.com/news/local/011705a1_tsunamiaid/1

¹⁵ Richard Becker et al., NATO in the Balkans: Voices of Opposition (New York; Leftbooks, 1998); Internet; accessed 30 December 2007; available from http://www.iacenter.org-/bosnia/publaw.htm; Foreign Appropriations Law 101-513 which states Sec. 599A. Six months after the date of enactment of this Act, (1) none of the funds appropriated or otherwise made available pursuant to this Act shall be obligated or expended to provide any direct assistance to the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, and (2) the Secretary of the Treasury shall instruct the United States Executive Director of each international financial institution to use the voice and vote of the United States to oppose any assistance of the respective institutions to the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia: Provided, That this section shall not apply to assistance intended to support democratic parties or movements, emergency or humanitarian assistance, or the furtherance of human rights: Provided further, That this section shall not apply if all six of the individual Republics of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia have held free and fair multiparty elections and are not engaged in a pattern of systematic gross violations of human rights: Provided further, That notwithstanding the failure of the individual Republics of the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia to have held free and fair multiparty elections within six months of the enactment of this Act, this section shall not apply if the Secretary of State certifies that the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia is making significant strides toward complying with the

obligations of the Helsinki Accords and is encouraging any Republic which has not held free and fair multiparty elections to do so.

- ¹⁶ David Binder, "US, Citing Human Rights, Halts Economic Aid to Yugoslavia," *New York Times*, 19 May 1991, p.10.
- ¹⁷ David Binder, "Evolution in Europe; Yugoslavia Seen Breaking Up Soon," *New York Times*, 28 November 1990, sec. A, p. 7.

- ²⁰ Jane's Intelligence Review, 1 February 1995, The Balkan Medllin as presented on the SIRUS webpage http://www.siri-us.com/backgrounders/Archives_Kosovo/KLA-Osama.html; Internet; accessed 1 January 2008.
- ²¹ Rebecca Nelson, *The Handy History Answer Book* (Canton, MI: Visible Ink Press, 1999), 260.

International Law with regard to justness of war is set forth in: Classic just war doctrine contained in the works of St. Thomas and Thomas Aquinas; Hugo Grotius' (1583-1645) supposition in *Concerning the Law of War and Peace*, the definitive text on international law that natural law as it basis, he stated a premise of the sovereignty and equality of all states of the world; The Treaties of Westphalia (1646); The Lieber and Lincoln code of the Civil war; The Geneva Convention (1864); customary laws, legal writing and conventions influence the application by the International Criminal court.

- ²² Vienna Convention of the Law of Treaties, available from http://fletcher.tufts.edu/multi/texts/BH538.txt, internet; accessed 24 March 2008.
- ²³ *UN Charter*, available from http://www.un.org/aboutun/charter/; Internet; accessed 13 February 2008.
- ²⁴ Chris Abbott, "Rights and Responsibilities Resolving the Dilemma of Humanitarian Intervention," *Global Dialogue*, *Oxford Research Group*, 7 (Winter/Spring 2005): 73-75

Based on blatant violations of human rights, the UN intervened in Iraq in 1991 and Somalia in 1992. Likewise, the French intervened in Rwanda in 1994 and the UNPROFOR in Bosnia in 1994-95. However, the UN stipulates that its personnel cannot take offensive action, but can only protect themselves. Indeed, in Bosnia the UN was ridiculed for its lack of action to protect civilians in the battle in Srebrenica.

- ²⁵ Edwina S. Campbell, "From Kosovo to the War on Terror, The Collapsing Transatlantic Consensus, 1999-2002," *Strategic Studies Quarterly* (Fall 2007): 44. Professor of National Security Studies, Air University's Command and Staff College, Maxwell Air Force Base.
- ²⁶ Parameters, Ronald Scott Mangum. NATO's attack on Serbia: Anomaly or Emerging Doctrine? Winter 2000-01 p40-52.

¹⁸ Ibid.

¹⁹ Parenti. 27.

²⁷ Wilson P. Nagan and Craig Hammer, "The Changing Character of Sovereignty in International Law and International Relations," available from http://www.law.ufl.edu/faculty/publications/pdf/sov.pdf; Internet; accessed 10 January 2008.

Argues that the legitimacy of law is tied to the theoretical justification that law emanates from an authoritative source, the sovereign. The collapse of modern sovereignty into imperial claims of the past is highly problematic because unilateral, parochial actions can never sustain the interdependence required to have good governance. Peace, development and empowerment of civil society, which comprise goals of the UN, are a sound foundation for the world. But the Charter does not define sovereignty and suggests that people of the world are the ultimate source of international authority.

²⁸ Available from: http://www.prweb.com/releases/2002/2/prweb33718.php,Internet; accessed 31 January 2008.

Ante Pavelic led the Nazi government of the Independent Sate of Croatia. He was responsible for the mass murderer of 80,000 Jews, 30,000 Gypsies, and over 500,000 Serbs. He survived the Second World War and never faced a war crimes trial. Instead Pavelic was offered sanctuary by the Vatican and became a security advisor to Juan and Eva Person before retiring to Spain. Key to Pavelics survival was the Croatian Treasury, the plunder of concentration camps and massacres throughout the Balkans and beyond. Orthodox Christian churches and Jewish synagogues were plundered and the property of Serbs, Jews, Gypsies, Ukrainians and others were confiscated. The crimes of Pavelic and the Ustashe were so barbaric that even hardened Nazis were disgusted by it.

²⁹ Nation, 98.

The Croatian Constitution intentionally reduced 17 percent of the population to a national minority. It purged Serbs from jobs in state and local administration and police positions and instituted obligatory oaths.

- ³⁰ Jasenovac Web-page, available from http://www.jasenovacinfo.com/cd/biblioteka/pavelicpapers/cia/cia0001.html; Internet; accessed 7 February 2008.
- ³¹ Peter Ellingsen, "Shattered Museum a Monument to Balkan Hatred," *The Age* (Melbourne, Australia, 3 August 1995).

Jasenovac was a WWII concentration camp operated by the "Independent state of Croatia" established by Adolph Hitler and its SS element the Croatia Ustashe in support of Nazi Germany. The Ustashe were responsible for between 200,000 and 700,000 Serbs, Jews and gypsies' being burned in ovens or shot. Croatians' deplored Jasenovac and felt persecuted by its legacy. The Croatians want to erase their past as murderers, never victims. Jasenovacs destruction by the Croatians in 1991 set the scene for the genocidal killings and other atrocities as the Serbs saw proof of Croatian brutality in destroying a cultural heritage site.

After the fall of the JNA garrision in 1991, a number of Serb citizens fearing for their safety, left the town, but were persuaded to return by Croatian authorities, who guaranteed their security. Shortly thereafter, in late September 1991, over 120 Gospic Serbs, including prominent

³² Johnstone, 28.

professors and judges, were abducted and murdered. It was a warning to Serbs – they were no longer safe in Croatia. According to Croatian human rights activists, this was the first major massacre of civilians in the Yugoslav civil wars.

- ³³ Chris Hedges, "Croatian's Confessions Describe Torture and Killing on Vast Scale," *New York Times*, 5 February 1997, p.A.1.
- ³⁴ Nicola Tallant, "Nazi Fugitives Were Helped by DeValera," *London Times*, 7 January 2007, p.5.

Andrija Artukovic worked for Hitler as the minister for the interior in Croatia. Victims in Artukovic's camps died from a mixture of hard labor, starvation and poisoning. He had a particular penchant for poisoning children and enjoyed having his picture taken with dead bodies. He arrived in London in 1947 via a Franciscan Church in Switzerland. He left for America in 1948 and settled in California. Cathal O'Shannon, who has researched Ireland's treatment of the Nazi's after 1945, has discovered that there is a file on Artukovic in the Irish Department of Foreign Affairs. However, the government has refused to release it. His connections and power in America were provided by Croatian Americans and the Roman Catholic church.

- ³⁵ Mary Thornton, "Nazi War Crimes Suspect Extradited," *Washington Post*, 13 February 1986, p. A4.
- ³⁶ Alex N. Dragnich, *Serbia's Historical Heritage* (New York: Columbia University Press 1994), 27.

The Krajina was the Serbian part of Croatia. As the Croatian secessionist movement materialized while Yugoslavia fell apart, the right of self-determination arose in the Krajina. Significantly, hundreds of years ago, the Serbs were invited to that land by the Austro-Hungarian Empire to serve in the imperial army and protect the border from the Ottoman Empire. The great Serbian migration of 1690-91 initiated by the Patriarch Arsenije III Crnojevic led 30,000 of his clan to the Krajina eventually culminating with about 200,000 Serbs in the region. This is further discussed as part of the cultural history of the region and people in Susan L. Woodward. *Balkan Tragedy* (Washington D.C.: Brookings Institute, 1995), 35.

³⁷ GEN Charles G. Boyd, "Making Peace with the Guilty, The Truth about Bosnia," *Foreign Affairs* 74 (September/October 1995), available from LexisNexis Academic [database on-line] accessed 20 February 2008.

- ³⁹ Christopher Cox, *House Republican Policy Committee Policy Perspective*, available from http://www.fas.org/irp/news/1996/hrpc_iranalt.htm; Internet; accessed 7 February 2008.
- ⁴⁰ Robert Marquand, "In Croatia, Peace Is Time to Prepare for War" *The Christian Science Monitor*, (8 December 1992), available from LexisNexis Academic [database on-line] accessed 21 February 2008.
- ⁴¹ Metropolitan Desk, *The New York Times*, 21 April 1993. A2 available from LexisNexis Academic [database on-line] accessed on 21 February 2008.

³⁸ Nation, 111.

- ⁴² Charlotte Eagar, "Fears of New fighting as Serb Troops Mass," *The Observer (London)*, 7 May 1995, available from LexisNexis Academic [database on-line] accessed 1 February 2008.
 - 43 Ibid.
- ⁴⁴ Deutsche Presse-Agentur, "CIA Nominee Admits 'Mistake' on Iran-Bosnia Arms Policy," 12 March 1997 available from LexisNexis Academic [database on-line] accessed 1 February 2008. Anthony Lake was Clinton's former national security advisor being considered by the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence.
- ⁴⁵ Jonathan Eyal, "Tudjman's March to Victory Seals Doom of Muslims," *The Times (London)*, 5 August 1995, available from LexisNexis Academic [database on-line] accessed 2 February 2008.
- ⁴⁶ Ed Vulliamy, "Clinton's IranGate Spooks CIA," *The Observer (London*), 2 June 1996, available from LexisNexis Academic [database on-line] accessed on 2 February 2008.
- ⁴⁷ Tim Weiner and Raymond Bonner, "Gun-running in the Balkans: C.I.A. and Diplomats Collide," *New York Times*, 29 May 1996, sec. A, 1.
 - ⁴⁸ "4 Navy Jets Bomb Serb Missile Sites," Navy Times, 25 August. 1995, p.2.
- ⁴⁹ COL George Jatras, USAF (Ret.), "What about the U.S. Role in Croatian Atrocities?," *The Washington Times*, sec. B Letters, p. 2.
- ⁵⁰ Michael Evans, "Croatia Launches All-out Offensive," *London Times*, 5 August 1995. available from LexisNexis Academic [database on-line] accessed 1 February 2008.
 - ⁵¹ Ibid.
 - ⁵² Jatras.
- ⁵³ David A. Fulghum, "CIA to Fly Missions from Inside Croatia," *Aviation Week & Space Technology*, 141. (11 July 1994): 20, available from LexisNexis Academic [database on-line] accessed 1 February 2008.
- ⁵⁴ Tim Kennedy, "CIA Selects Secret Base in Croatia to Monitor Bosnia," *Saudi Gazette* 19 July 1994, available from LexisNexis Academic [database on-line] accessed 1 February 2008.
 - ⁵⁵ Nation, 191.
 - ⁵⁶ Roy Gutman with John Barry, "What Did the CIA Know," *Newsweek*, 27 August 2001, 30.
 - 57 lbid. As early as 1993 there is evidence of UAV launches from this U.S. base in Croatia.
 - ⁵⁸ Boyd.
 - ⁵⁹ Abbott. 3.

⁶⁰ Region Headquarters Allied Forces Southern Europe, available from http://www.afsouth.nato.int/factsheets/DeliberateForceFactSheet.htm; Internet; accessed 7 February 2008.

⁶¹ Nation, 191.

⁶² Leonard Doyle, "Muslims Slaughter Their Own People," *The Independent,* London, 22 August 1992. This article reports that "western officers believe some of the worst killings in Sarajevo, including the massacre of at least 16 people in the bread queue, were the work of the city's mainly-Muslim defenders-not Serb besiegers – as a propaganda ploy to win world sympathy and trigger military intervention

⁶³ Ibid.

⁶⁴ Ibid. It has been expressed in confidential reports circulating at U.N. headquarters and in classified briefings to US policy makers in Washington...that suggest Sarajevo's defenders...staged several attacks on their own people in the hope of dramatizing the city's plight in the face of insuperable Serbian odds

⁶⁵ Ibid.

⁶⁶ Ibid. U.N. officials then admitted they were suspicious about the circumstances but could not go public with their thoughts without jeopardizing the UN mission and possibly endangering the lives of UN peace-keepers.

⁶⁷ Peter Brock, *Media Cleansing and Dirty Reporting (Los Angeles:GM Books, 2006), 28.* Hackworth states that a CIA analyst suggested that the Muslims were up to their old trick of shelling themselves and blaming the Serbs.

⁶⁸ John F. Burns, "A French General Sees a Bosnian Plot: Says Shelling Was Meant to Kill Him and Another Who Oppose Intervention," *New York Times International*, 26 December 1992.

⁶⁹ Gregory Copley, "Image Manipulation Prolongs War" *Defense and Foreign Affairs Strategic Policy London* (31 January 1994). available from LexisNexis Academic [database online], accessed 8 March 2008.

Pazit Ravina, "Bosnia-Herzegovina," *Davar*, 18 February 1994, available from http://www.srpska-mreza.com/kosovo/bosnia-jiwd-f-94.html; Internet; accessed 2 February 2008.

⁷¹ Ibid. It was also stated that there is photographic evidence shows that some of the "bodies" were dummies, quickly moved into what was a sparsely-populated market square (not the crowded one, as Muslim sources claimed).

⁷² Ibid.

⁷³ Boyd.

⁷⁴ CNN, "UN Blames Bosnian Serbs for Attack," 29 August 1995; available from http://www.cnn/com/Bosnia/updates/aug95/8-29; Internet; accessed 13 February 2008.

This story describes how a week of demonstrations by the Serbian population in Montenegro and threats of the population to join militias are pressuring the Belgrade government to do something about the Kosovo Albanians killing Serbs.

⁷⁵ David Binder, "Bosnia's Bombers," *The Nation*, 2 October 1995, p. 336-337.

⁷⁶ "US-Bosnia Achieve War on Serbs," Defense and Foreign Affairs Strategic Policy:

⁷⁷ GEN Charles G. Boyd, "Appease with Dishonor; The Truth about the Balkans; Peace Principles," *Foreign Affairs* (Novermber/December 1995).

⁷⁸ Boyd, "Making Peace with the Guilty."

⁷⁹ Boyd, "Making Peace with the Guilty."

⁸⁰ Steven Erlanger and Christopher S. Wren, "Early Count Hints at Fewer Kosovo Deaths," *New York Times,* 11 November 1999, available from http://www.nytimes.com/library/world/europe/111199kosovo-un.html; Internet; accessed 9 January 2008.

⁸¹ Richard Gwyn, "No Genocide, No Justification for War on Kosovo," *Toronto Star*, 3 November 1999. available from LexisNexis Academic [database on-line], accessed 9 March 2008.

⁸² Nation, 251.

⁸³ Ibid.

⁸⁴ Ibid.

⁸⁵ Steven Erlanger.

⁸⁶ MG (Ret.) Lewis MacKenzie, Canada, "We Bombed the Wrong Side," *The National Post (Canada)* 6 April 2004; available from http://www.freerepublic.com/focus/f-news/1112681/posts; Internet; accessed 1 February 2008.

⁸⁷ QNP, "Ethnic Violence Leaves 5 Dead in Yugoslavia," 2 February 1990, available from LexisNexis Academic [database on-line], accessed 1 February 2008.

⁸⁸ Richard Gwyn, "No Genocide, No Justification for War on Kosovo," *Toronto Star*, 3 November 1999; and Jeffrey Fleishman, "Death Visits Kosovo's War at Nighttime, Where Life Has Become a Series of Skirmishes," *Philadelphia Inquirer*, 28 May 1998, p.1. In 1999 there were about 2,000,000 Albanians and 200,000 Serbs living in Kosovo together. In February 1990 there was a mass uprising of the Serb population pledging to form militias for a counterinsurgency. An insurrection and killing of Serbs by the Albanians necessitated the Belgrade Federal Government to intercede in quelling an insurgency.

⁸⁹ Ibid.

- ⁹⁰ BBC Monitoring Europe Political. Kosovo Assembly Committee Opposes Sale of Trepca Mine, 31 July 2007, available from LexisNexis Academic [database on-line], accessed 6 February 2008.
- ⁹¹ Hon. Ron Paul of Texas. *Congressional Record*, 5 May 1999, p. H2778, available from http://www.house.gov/paul/congrec99/cr050599-5min.html; Internet; accessed 10 December 2007.
- ⁹² Stella Jatras, "KLA, Well Known Thugs," *Washington Times* 16 May 1999, available from LexisNexis Academic [database on-line], accessed 10 March 2008.
- ⁹³ Roger Boyes and Kske Wrightn, "Drug Money Linked to Kosovo Rebels," *London Times* 24 March 1999, available from http://ebird.dtic.mil/Mar1999/e19990324drugs.htm; Internet; accessed 24 March 1999.
 - ⁹⁴ MacKenzie.
- ⁹⁵ Christian Alfonsi, Circles in the Sand, Why We Went Back to Iraq(New York: Doubleday, 2006), 294
- ⁹⁶ COL David Hackworth, "The CIA Strikes Out Again," 2001, available from http://emperors-clothes.com/docs/hack2.htm; Internet; accessed 8 January 2008.
- ⁹⁷ Tom Walker and Aidan Laverty, "CIA Aided Kosovo Guerrilla Army," *Sunday Times* London,12 March 2000, available from LexisNexis Academic [database on-line], accessed 2 February 2008.
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 - ⁹⁹ MacKenzie.
- ¹⁰⁰ Dana Priest, *The Mission: Waging War and Keeping the Peace with America's Military.* (New York: W.W.Norton & Company, 2004), 291.
 - ¹⁰¹ Ibid, 301.
- ¹⁰² John V. Fine, Jr., *The Early Medieval Balkans: A Critical Survey from the Sixth to the Late Twelfth Century (*Ann Arbor: The University of Michigan Press, 1991), 25.
- ¹⁰³ Gary J. Bass "Independence Daze," *The New York Times*, 6 January 2008 available from http://www.nytimes.com/2008/01/06/magazine/06wwin-idealab-t.htm; Internet: accessed 19 January 2008.
- ¹⁰⁴ John Bolton, Lawrence Eagleburger, and Peter Rodman, "Warning Light on Kosovo," *Washington Times*, 31 January 2008 states a reassessment of America's Kosovo policy is long overdue; and James Lyons, "Kosovo Train Wreck Warnings," *The Washington Times*, 2 January 2008.

- ¹⁰⁵ American Srbobran, "Sending "EU Mission to Kosovo Illegal Act," 16 January 2008, p.1.
- ¹⁰⁶ "BBC Monitoring Europe-Political Serbian Presidential Candidates Present Views on Kosovo," 31 January 2008, available from LexisNexis Academic [database on-line], accessed February 5 2008.
 - ¹⁰⁷ Abbott.
 - ¹⁰⁸ Nation,131.
- ¹⁰⁹ This concept is laid out in two books: (1) Media Cleansing: Dirty Reporting Journalism and Tragedy in Yugoslavia by Peter Brock (Los Angeles: Graphics Management Press, 1993); and (2) The US Media and Yugoslavia 1991-1995 by James J. Sadkovich (Westport, CT: Praeger Publishers, 1998).
 - ¹¹⁰ David Owen, *Balkan Odyssey* (London: Victor Gollancz, 1995), 113.
- Journalism and Tragedy in Yugoslavia (Los Angeles, GM Books, 2006) Indeed, Peter Brock wrote of many of the heinous images being incorrectly portrayed by the media as Muslims when actually being Serbs. Importantly, the Aug 1992 *Time* cover photo showing a skeletal man behind barbed wire described as a Muslim prisoner in a Serbian concentration camp. In fact, was a fence around the journalists. The Trnopolje camp was for safety not imprisonment. Peter Brock p. 251 Additionally, the 4 January 1993 issue of *Newsweek* displayed gruesome pictures of bodies and a story that began: "Is there any way to stop Serbian atrocities in Bosnia?" Actually, the victims were Serbs and Peter Brock, Star Tribune December 1993 Skewed Images from Bosnia reprinted in American Srbobran December 29 1993, p. 8.
- ¹¹² U.S. General Accounting Office (GAO), GAO Response to the House Chairman on Government Operations, Comptroller Opinion B-229069, 30 September 1997.
- ¹¹³ Benny Avni , "Advisor to Annan Triggers Concern," *The New York Sun*, 9 March 2005, available from http://www.nysun.com/article/10265; Internet; accessed 8 January 2008.
- ¹¹⁴ Nik Gowing, "Media Coverage: Help or Hinderance in Conflict Prevention," Wilson Center article available from http://www.wilsoncenter.org/subsites/cc/pdc/pubs/media/media.htm; Internet; accessed 2 February 2008.

- ¹¹⁶ Vojislav Kostunica "Justice for Serbia: Kosovo Independence Imperils Our Democracy" *Washington Post*, 12 July 2006, p. A15.
- 117 The Woodrow Wilson Center Webpage, available from http://wilsoncenter.org/index.cfm?fuseaction=director.welcome; Internet; accessed on 31 January 2008. The Woodrow Wilson Center was established by an act of Congress in 1968. The Wilson Center is a nonpartisan institute for advanced study and a neutral forum for open, serious, and informed dialogue. It brings pre-eminent thinkers to Washington for extended periods of time to interact with policymakers through a large number of programs and projects. The Center seeks to separate the important from the inconsequential and to take a historical and broad perspective

¹¹⁵ Ibid.

on the issues. Wilson's idealism and status as a great world leader led to the creation of the Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars as the U.S. memorial to him. The Center is not an institution for the study of Woodrow Wilson, but aims to embody Wilson's ideals by putting scholarship at the service of the world's public life.

- ¹²⁰ Susan L. Woodward, *Balkan Tragedy: Chaos and Dissolution after the Cold War* (Washington D.C.: The Brookings Institution, 1995), 3.
- ¹²¹ Representative Ron Paul, Texas, "Against NATO Expansion," House of Representative, 30 March 2004.
 - ¹²² Chomsky, Failed States, 206.

- the rise of Japanese militarist aggression and a Japanese empire in the Pacific, while *The Day of the Saxon*, commissioned by British Field Marshal Lord Frederick Roberts, predicted the rise of a greater German Reich based on national supremacy and ethnic purity. Neither of these books sold particularly well in America, but *The Valor of Ignorance* sold 84,000 copies in Japan and impressed both General Adna Chaffee and General Douglas MacArthur, who tried unsuccessfully to make it compulsory reading at West Point. His books remain little known today, as his theories were not particularly revolutionary; other geopoliticians could also see the same forces converging, but the public did not want to hear about it. When Sun Yat-sen succeeded in making China a republic in 1911-1912, he made Lea a full general and his chief of staff. A stroke several months later, however, forced him to give up these positions and retire to the United States, where he died at age 35.
 - ¹²⁵ Homer Lea, *The Valor of Ignorance* (Harbor: Simon Publications, 2001), Xvii.
- ¹²⁶ Ruslan Khashig, "Georgian Region Abkhazia Appeals for Recognition of Independence, Citing Kosovo," The Associated Press, 7 March 2008, available from LexisNexis Academic [database on-line], accessed 7 March 2008.
- ¹²⁷"Ballot bok takes wing;Nepal, The Economist, 8 March 2008, available from LexisNexis Academic [database on-line], accessed 8 March 2008.
- ¹²⁸ Troubling News from the Caucasus; Armenia, *The Economist*, 8 March 2008. available from LexisNexis Academic [database on-line], accessed 8 March 2008.
- ¹²⁹ Christine Pirovolakis, "Cyprus Fears Kosovo Independence Will Have Impact at Home," Deutsche Presse Agentur, 29 January 2008. available from LexisNexis Academic [database on-line], accessed 9 March 2008.
- ¹³⁰"Hawaii Independent and Sovereign," available from http://www.hawaii-nation.org/; Internet; accessed 9 March 2008.

¹¹⁸ Gowing.

¹¹⁹ UN Resolution 1244.

¹²³ Ibid.

- ¹³¹ What Is MEChA?, available from http://www.mayorno.com/whoismecha.html; Internet; accessed 9 march 2008.
- ¹³² David Bosco, "Moral Principle vs. Military Necessity," *American Scholar* (Winter 2008): 34.

Described the first code of conduct during warfare, created by a Civil War – era Prussian immigrant, reflected ambiguities we struggle with to this day. The Lieber and Lincoln code of the Civil war tried to embody some of the serious contradictions in the struggle to humanize warfare. However, Article 5 To save the country is paramount to everything else.

- ¹³³ U.S. citizens are obliged to judge their government critically and thoughtfully to ensure truthfulness and to maintain their freedom.
- ¹³⁴ US Constitution. Amendment IX of the Constitution, reads "The enumeration in the Constitution of certain rights shall not be construed to deny or disparage others retained by the people." An expectation of truth in government is a right of the American people.
- ¹³⁵ Fredrick Douglas, available from http://www.tqnyc.org/NYC030360/poem2.htm; Internet; accessed 10 March 2008

¹³⁶ Bosco, 25.

¹³⁷ Chomsky, Lecture on Just War Theory.

¹³⁸ Lea, 86.